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AUTHOR Beck, William W.; And Others
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ABSTRACT

These papers examine sociological and political problems associated with school desegregation on the local level in Dallas, Boston, Columbus, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Detroit, and Los Angeles. Each presentation addresses several of the following concerns: (1) community and school composition, racial and ethnic ratios, and business and political influences; (2) historical parameters; (3) judicial proceedings and precedents; (4) community and group reactions; (5) curricular and instructional programs developed to deal with desegregation such as magnet schools, inservice education training, and multicultural approaches; and (6) the role of social studies teachers in desegregation. There are different emphases and processes discussed in each case study. Beck and Linden write that Dallas has made several compromises in its 1976 desegregation plan. Siegal believes that Boston is making long term progress since the initial violent reaction to desegregation. Bedwell deals with Indianapolis' history of segregation and notes that more court battles are ahead. In Detroit, Gendernalik sees more court action but also notes that community forces are cooperating in that city. Howe writes about the "see-saw" Boards of Education in Cincinnati. Carrison describes 15 years of school desegregation problems in Los Angeles and maintains that a socioeconomic head count must be combined with racial ethnic quotas within a metropolitan environment. References for each presentation are provided.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY PROBLEMS IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
SEVEN CASE STUDIES

A Three Hour Workshop/Paper

by

CHAIRPERSON: William W. Beck, Southern Methodist University

PRESENTERS: William W. Beck, Southern Methodist University;

Glenn M. Linden, Southern Methodist University; K. Marie

Jenkins, Dallas Independent School District; Michael E. Siegel,

The American University; John Farley, Ohio State University;

Robert E. Jewett, Ohio State University; Helen Cooper Howe,

Cincinnati Public Schools; Ralph K. Bedwell, Indianapolis Public

Schools; Mary Gendernalik, Wayne State University; Muriel Paskin

Carrison, California State College, Dominguez Hills

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School desegregation proponents believe that, in order to build a genuine sense of respect for and understanding of community, diverse socioeconomic, racial and cultural backgrounds must be respected. Although a physical mixing of culturally different students and teachers has taken place in many schools through both voluntary and forced approaches, a deeper understanding has yet to take place. The nine members of the workshop team will use a comparative model, i.e., Dallas, Boston, Columbus, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Detroit and Los Angeles, in examining the sociological and political problems connected with school desegregation at the local level.

As will be discussed, some communities, like Boston, have experienced violence and bedlam in the initial stages of desegregation. Other cities such as Dallas are experiencing some success with its most recent desegregation plan, but the courts may order additional changes. In all seven case studies, as will be noted, the courts have taken an active role in the desegregation process. Although each case study is unique, common strands such as legalistic actions will be identified during the workshop. The workshop's format is as follows:

I. PANEL (90 minutes): "An Overview of Seven Cities"

- A. Introduction: Bill Beck
- B. Dallas: Glenn Linden, Marie Jenkins, Bill Beck
- C. Boston: Michael Siegel
- D. Columbus: Robert E. Jewett
- E. Cincinnati: Helen Howe
- (Break)
- F. Indianapolis: Ralph Bedwell
- G. Detroit: Mary Gendernalik
- H. Los Angeles: Muriel Carrison

Each panel member will select the central controversy or event from his or her city. They have been asked to address themselves to several of the following concerns:

- A. Community and school composition and demographics, e.g., racial and ethnic ratios, business and political influences.
- B. Historical parameters that have shaped the case, if any.
- C. Judicial proceedings and precedents or, if voluntary plan, its origin.
- D. Desegregation proposals and the plan.
- E. Community and group reactions, especially ethnic and racial groups and business and political leaders.
- F. Curricular and instructional programs developed to deal with desegregation, e.g., magnet schools, materials, interpersonal and other inservice education training, multi-cultural materials.
- G. Role of social studies teachers in desegregation.

Each participant will receive a short summary of the remarks by panel members. See "materials".

II. TWO SELECTED CASE STUDIES (30 minutes each for a total of 60 minutes):
"A Closer In-Depth Look at Desegregation"

Each member of the audience will select two case studies for more in-depth recitation and discussions.

III. THE SITUATION OF THE PARTICIPANT (30 minutes): "Your Unique Desegregation Problems"

Three small discussion groups, with presenters as leaders, will facilitate discussion on the unique situations of the participants. We can examine these types of questions:

- A. Can you identify with any of these school districts desegregation problems?
- B. What unique problems not discussed here has your school district faced with desegregation?
- C. Do you have a desegregation plan? If so, is it working? If so, what are the "secrets" of successful school desegregation? If it's failing, why? Or if it's weak, why?
- D. How has the board of education responded? Superintendent? Levels of administrators? Teachers? Students? Community groups? The Courts? Media? You?
- E. Is desegregation worth the effort? What are some of its "spin-offs?"
- F. How are these accepted: busing, magnet school concept, curricular innovations?
- G. What has been the role of social studies teachers, instruction and material development in the plan?

MATERIALS: Each presenter has prepared a four page, single spaced, typed summary of his or her case study. These materials may provide a "spring board" for an inquiry lesson for your social studies classroom.

As you examine these materials, notice the different emphases and processes in each case study. Beck and Linden write that Dallas has made several compromises in its 1976 desegregation plan, but significant progress has been made, e.g., 50% fewer one-race schools since 1971. The plan's most serious flaw is its all-black subdistrict, but "separate and superior education" appears to be the district's justification. Siegel believes that Boston is making long-term progress since the initial violent reaction to desegregation. He sees encouraging signs that Boston may represent "a relatively successful school desegregation effort."

Bedwell is less certain about Indianapolis desegregation. After dealing with the district's history of segregation, he notes that more court battles are ahead. This city appears to be behind Boston and Dallas in making steady progress. In Detroit, Gendernalik also sees more court actions "in the wings". She wonders why we haven't realized that legalistic approaches don't always solve difficult social problems. Presently, she maintains, community forces are cooperating in Detroit, a healthy sign.

Howe writes about "see-saw" Boards of Education in Cincinnati that in general, have dragged their feet on school desegregation by attempting to provide numerous educational options rather than busing. She also makes this interesting observation: "Any desegregation plan that does not take economic desegregation into effect will not be effective at all." Carrison describes 15 bitter years of school desegregation problems in Los Angeles. She maintains that socio-economic head count must be combined with racial/ethnic quotas within a metropolitan environment. She also discusses the monitoring system used by the courts.

A volatile and significant public issue, school desegregation must receive more emphasis in the social studies curriculum. Students can learn much about cultural diversity, racism and social justice from a study of such a controversial issue.

DALLAS SCHOOL DESEGREGATION*

William W. Beck
Division of Educational Studies
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, Texas 75275

Glenn M. Linden
Department of History
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, Texas 75275

This paper is a case study of an evolutionary approach to school desegregation. Concerted opposition of the 1950's was to be replaced by "guarded" cooperation in the 1960's and, finally, conflict coupled with more genuine cooperation leading to slow but progressive changes in the 1970's. The Dallas school desegregation history isn't a narration of noble efforts by a city to repay for past injustices, i.e., segregation, but is the story of a conservative, business-oriented urban center, with its array of races and classes, searching for answers to difficult school questions. The Dallas school desegregation history since "Brown" will be reported and analyzed. Finally, the writers' beliefs and feelings about the future of Dallas school desegregation will be stated.

The Avoidance Years of Dallas Desegregation History. Like many other cities prior to 1954, Dallas had maintained numerous segregated schools for years. Like the citizens of other cities, Dallasites responded to the Brown decision with apprehension and disbelief. Locating allies in two federal judges who, in making their decisions, disregarded the Supreme Court's views, the community and school leaders avoided the realities of the situation for the remainder of the decade.

In 1955, Albert Bell filed a suit against Robert S. Rippey to have the schools desegregated, but presiding Federal Judge William S. Atwell ruled against the plaintiff, declaring that the Supreme Court had overstepped its authority. Atwell's decision was subsequently overturned by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 1957, the NAACP brought a case in behalf of two black children who wanted to attend a white school four blocks from their home, but their request was denied by Judge Atwell, whose decision was again overruled by the Circuit Court. Atwell then ordered that all Dallas schools be desegregated, but the Fifth Circuit again intervened, ruling that a more reasonable

*Portions of this work were taken from a paper delivered at the 1978 Texas Council for the Social Studies Convention in Corpus Christi, Texas. See also the following: (1) Beck, William W.; Linden, Glenn; and Marks, William. "Desegregation and its Implications for Social Studies: The Dallas Case Study." Paper presented at the 56th meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies, Washington, D.C., 7 November 1976. (2) Beck, Williams W.; Linden, Glenn; and Siegel, Michael. "An Assessment of Local Community Problems in School Desegregation: The Boston and Dallas Case Studies." Paper presented at the 57th meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies, Cincinnati, Ohio, November, 1977. (3) Beck, William W., and Sobol, Marion. "An Analysis of Black Parental Attitudes Toward Dallas School Desegregation: Implications for Social Studies." Paper presented at the 57th meeting of College and University Faculty Assembly of the National Council for the Social Studies, Cincinnati, Ohio, November 1977.

plan should be prepared. In 1959, after the same Circuit Court ordered the DISD to prepare a desegregation plan within thirty days, the Dallas School Board proposed the "Stairstep Plan" whereby one grade per year would be integrated, beginning with the first grade. District Judge T. Whitfield Davidson rejected the plan and ordered separate schools be maintained and a third type of school be established for those wishing to attend an integrated school. He also was overruled by the Circuit Court.

Thus ended the first phase of Dallas School desegregation. The opposition of two federal judges probably reflected, however, majority opinion in Dallas since few were willing to work for integration in these early years. The period of avoidance and resistance was followed in the 1960's by a period of "guarded" cooperation, i.e., citizens were semi-cooperative but not willing to whole-heartedly accept and work toward genuine school desegregation.

The "Guarded" Cooperation Years. In the fall of 1961, the Dallas School Board implemented the "Stairstep Plan" under the mandate of the Fifth Circuit Court. Beginning with grade one, compulsory segregation based on race was to be abolished a grade a year until, by 1972, all grades had been desegregated. The School Board and political and community leaders complied with the court order. In fact, the plan was speeded up in 1965 and all Dallas schools were declared desegregated in September, 1967. The DISD declared that the state imposed segregation system had been eliminated. Most citizens of Dallas believed their school desegregation problem had been solved, but they were wrong.

The Conflict and Compromise Years. The 1970's were marked by conflict, legal battles and the 1976 compromise plan that still has its critics and shortcomings. In October, 1970, Eddie Tasby filed a suit in Federal District Court charging that the DISD was continuing a dual school system through the use of the "Neighborhood" or "freedom-of-choice" concept, school building sites and the staffing of teaching and administrative positions. Dallas Legal Services (DLS) attorneys filed the suit to desegregate all remaining one-race schools. The first response of Dallas community and school leaders, who did not believe a dual system existed, was opposition and conflict. Lengthy legal fights for the next four years took place in federal courts in Dallas and Houston, the Fifth Circuit Court, and the U. S. Supreme Court.

The Dallas desegregation trial took place from July 12 to July 16, 1970. The presiding U. S. District Judge William M. Taylor, Jr., stated that he found 70 schools that were 90% or more Anglo, 40 schools that were 90% or more black, 49 schools with 90% or more minority; and 91% of black students in 90% or more of the minority schools. "I find...a dual system still exists." He ordered the school leaders to formulate a new plan.

The school district responded with the "Confluence of Culture Desegregation Plan" that included the busing of limited numbers of inner-city black students to outlying secondary schools. The elementary plan was a "television desegregation plan" whereby minorities and Anglos in separate schools would communicate with each other via closed circuit television one hour daily. On August 2, 1971, the judge essentially adopted the DISD plan but ordered that more secondary students be "paired" in the Oak Cliff (black) area so that 15,000 secondary students would be bused. Judge Taylor also implemented a majority-to-minority transfer program.

The "pairing" provisions dealing with the black Oak Cliff area touched off a public furor. On August 23, the Fifth Circuit Court would stay the

elementary television plan. On August 7, 1971, Taylor stayed most of the junior and senior high busing. Eventually about 6,000 high school students, of which 98% were black, were bused under the 1971 court order.¹ Though one thousand Anglos were scheduled to be bused to formerly all-black high schools, fewer than fifty were still attending these schools four years later. Most white students were unwilling to attend schools in black neighborhoods and many disappeared and turned up in neighboring suburban schools. Black students, however, were bused into many white high schools and many were graduated. The attitude of black parents was a willingness to go along with busing if it meant a better education for their children.

During the four-year legal battles DISD was in limbo, the district became predominantly minority in composition. It had been 58% Anglo, 34% black, and 8% Mexican American in 1970. It was 41% Anglo in 1975. By the 1977-78 school year's end, the DISD would be 35.5% Anglo, 48% black, and 15% Mexican-American.² The total school enrollment declined from 163,000 in 1970 to 136,000 in 1978. Enrollments for the fall of 1978 were down only 2,000 students from the fall, 1977, enrollments, a plus since DISD had been losing 4,000-5,000 students a year since 1970.³ The city, however, is 60% Anglo, 30% black and 10% Mexican-American. Dallas is an Anglo-controlled and populated city with a minority school population.

In July, 1975, the Circuit Court rejected several key parts of the 1971 desegregation plan and ordered a new one to be implemented by January, 1976. During that time, Judge Taylor worked with various groups to create a desegregation plan acceptable to the Circuit Court, the DISD and Dallasites. He made a special plea to the business community to cooperate in finding an answer. The Dallas Alliance, a business community service organization which had occasionally worked on community problems, formed a task force composed of seven Anglos, seven blacks and seven Mexican-Americans. The Alliance met for 1500 hours for four months on their plan.

On April 7, 1976, after several minor changes, Judge Taylor issued the Dallas school desegregation order that basically followed the plan submitted by the Dallas Alliance. His order required the busing of 17,328 students. The NAACP, troubled over the lack of integration in the predominantly black area of Dallas, East Oak Cliff (EOC), appealed Taylor's order to the Fifth Circuit Court in April, 1976. In July, the Circuit Court denied without elaboration the NAACP's request to delay implementation of the desegregation order. On August 23, 1976, the DISD opened peacefully on the new desegregation plan, and it continues to follow that order for the 1978-79 school year.

More legal battles have been raging in the DISD after the April 21, 1978, decision of the Fifth Circuit Court that accepted most of the 1976 desegregation plan but rejected the pupil assignment plan. The Court realized that the number of one-race schools had been reduced by over 50% in a two year period - from 159 one-race schools to 68 schools. The Court noted that 41 of those 68 schools were outside EOC but that 27 of those schools were in the all-black subdistrict (of a total of 30 schools). The order directed a reevaluation of the magnet school effectiveness and ruled that Judge Taylor had erred by not providing transportation for students who elect the majority-to-minority transfer. (DISD does provide transportation but left the facts out of their briefs.) In an effort to defend its plan, the Dallas Board of Education has appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court which will consider the case in the fall of 1978.

The 1976 Desegregation Plan

The Dallas Plan contains the following provisions:

1. Six sub-districts are used for student assignment purposes, with each having approximately the racial makeup plus or minus 5% of the DISD as a whole, with the exception of East Oak Cliff and Seagoville. (The Seagoville sub-district was excluded since it was considered to be "naturally" integrated).
2. East Oak Cliff, the predominately black community in the southern portion of the city, remains a segregated subdistrict (98% black) and is excluded from busing; approximately 27,500 students were left in 27 one-race schools in this area of town. Forty-one per cent of all Dallas black students and 50% of black 4-6 grade students attend segregated schools. The two high schools are 99% black.
3. Busing will be minimized and will take place at grades 4-8 only. About 17,000 students were bused in 1977-78; 51% were black and 34%, Anglo.
4. Majority-to-minority transfers were to be encouraged. In 1976, blacks made 93% of the 3600 transfers.
5. Grade levels configurations are standardized throughout the district to include grades K-3 Early Childhood Education Centers, grades 4-6 Intermediate Schools, grades 7-8 Middle Schools, and grades 9-12 High Schools.
6. There are special schools--5 Vanguard schools for grades 4-6, 3 Academies for grades 7-8, and 6 Magnet Schools for grades 9-12.

Although the schools have achieved much publicity and more are being planned, they have not attracted large numbers of Anglos. The magnet high schools have 56-87% minority enrollments. The 7-8 grade magnets show 64-85% minority. With the exception of one school, 4-6 grade magnets are 67-99.5% minority. That exception, the school for the talented and gifted, is only 32% minority, which has troubled some persons. Since many minorities are enrolling in the magnets, a danger of resegregation exists unless the courts intervene.

7. Students who live in predominately black areas will be encouraged to consider transfer to schools in other areas.
8. Special programs--Career Education, Bilingual Education, Multi-Cultural Social Studies, and Plan A --will be expanded.
9. There will be a reduction of the adult-pupil ratio through tutoring by using parents, adult volunteers, older students and para-professionals. The adult ratio of 1-10 is a goal in the K-3 center.
10. Racial ratios for DISD teaching staff will be equal to the city's racial percentages. In December, 1976, the teacher figures were 30.5% black, 65% Anglo, and 4.5% Mexican-American.
11. Top administrators, approximately 142, will reflect the ethnic makeup of approximately 44% Anglo, 44% black and 12% Mexican-American. This goal is to be met by 1979.

Except for some segments of the black community who felt they had been betrayed because of the remaining all-black subdistrict, the 1976 Dallas desegregation plan has received strong support from virtually every segment of the Dallas community. Business leaders developed an effective public relations program to convince Dallasites to support the compromise plan. Many businesses, churches, universities and civic groups "adopted" schools and provide tutoring, often through "released" time for employees, and materials. Not a single prominent political figure opposed the plan, and special efforts were made to coordinate the policies of the School Board and the City Council. The Dallas School Board's plan had been rejected, but the trustees also supported the plan. Mexican-American community spokesmen supported the plan that recognized their people as a distinct ethnic group in the DISD.

Trends and Precedents. After serving ten years as DISD superintendent, Dr. Nolan Estes is leaving to accept a position as a professor of educational administration at the University of Texas. The president of the Dallas Board of Education, William Hunter, has announced that since he will be leaving Dallas, he will not seek reelection. These developments, coupled with the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet agreed to hear the Dallas Desegregation case, makes the future of Dallas schools very uncertain. The writers believe, nevertheless, that certain Dallas school desegregation trends, some of which are obviously operating in unique ways in other cities, can be identified. It is too early to have a very clear picture, but Dallas may be establishing educational precedents for, as Dr. Estes admits, there are no precedents for the Dallas approach.

1. In justifying the EOC segregated black schools, Dr. Estes and the Anglos on the Dallas Board of Education⁴ apparently believe that "freedom of choice" coupled with quality education are more important than complete integration and the elimination of one-race schools. Speaking before a community-based group that works with the schools called the NETWORK, Estes cited the all-black EOC as a "model for the nation" in creating urban education programs for the future. He went on to say that the Dallas plan could become a "landmark case" if it reached the Supreme Court since the EOC all-black sub-district would be an urban experiment in predominantly majority-minority education. "It is my belief," he said, "should it reach the U. S. Supreme Court, it would be affirmed and become a landmark case taking its place alongside "Swann vs. Charlotte-Mecklenburg."⁵ With joint themes of "freedom of choice" and quality education, Associate Superintendent Yvonne Ewell, who heads the segregated subdistrict, states that the EOC experiment is designed to "affirm the black experience." She alleges that EOC black students have become political pawns and the emphasis in East Oak Cliff should be on quality education and the learning tasks. Through curricular and instructional innovations, black students would then have access to numerous educational options.

The options open to black EOC students are numerous. Many have availed themselves of the majority-to-minority transfer program. The A. Harris Shopping Center in EOC has been purchased for use as a K-12 school and for other educational and social services. The four Metropolitan High Schools provide completely individualized and personalized approaches for "dropouts" or students who cannot adjust to regular DISD secondary schools. The Skyline Career Development Center received nationwide publicity as a prototype of successful career exploration schools. From that school evolved an array of optional magnet schools for students in grades 4-12; more such alternatives are being planned. Special education, multi-cultural and bilingual programs and materials have been developed and expanded. The "Partners in Reading" approach involving parents in their child's education is being enlarged, perhaps even to "Partners in Math." Reading scores in grades 1-3 in East Oak Cliff have risen over the past six years, according to a DISD study. Black children in first and second grades are at national norms in reading ability which, Dr. Estes feels, is unprecedented in any big city. Other scores of elementary students, however, aren't as impressive, and secondary students still score below national norms in reading and math.⁶

2. The DISD is offering a number of sweeping educational reforms in order to retain or regain support of the middle classes. Superintendent Estes had stated that the DISD is losing too many middle class students. Most of the innovative educational options that are available to black EOC students are also used to entice students in the other five subdistricts, e.g., magnet schools, majority-to-minority programs, multi-cultural curriculum materials and bilingual programs.

In addition, Dr. Estes pushes for programs that would appeal to middle class patrons, e.g., minimum proficiency exam prior to being given a high school diploma, gifted and talented student curriculum in every elementary school, requirement that students be at grade level in reading and math by the third grade or be placed in special programs, magnet schools that appeal to those classes. Some progress can be seen from a recent DISD study that showed more students transferred into DISD from private schools than transferred out. Grades 4-8, however, where involuntary busing occurs, experienced net losses of students to private schools.⁷

3. Community involvement, particularly businessmen and parents, is extremely important in enacting urban school changes. News media and television coverage has been substantial, including district-produced films with titles like, "Keep It Together, Dallas." The NETWORK, "adopt-a-school" and numerous other volunteer programs, an information "hot-line" and even Dr. Estes and other school leaders "driving a school bus" arrangements are efforts to reach out to the Dallas community and get them involved. Parents who enroll their children in the "Fundamentals" Academy, for example, sign an agreement stipulating their responsibilities, e.g., number of conferences per year. The "Partners-in-Reading" program has been highly publicized and has met with some success.

4. A unique approach to public education to help finance projects relating to desegregation has been the establishment of a private, non-profit, tax-exempt corporation dedicated to raising special funds for the DISD. Called Foundation for Quality Education, Inc., the private group attempts to secure private money for public education. The most recent plan calls for a \$113 million office complex called "Eastern Gateway" to be jointly developed by the DISD and the foundation. The complex would include a 51-story office building, a 210,000 square foot, seven story DISD administration building, and a three-story shopping mall. In addition, the complex would eventually guarantee DISD an annual income of from \$1.5 million to \$2 million.⁸

5. In spite of numerous innovative approaches and significant desegregation progress, the trend persists that Dallas Anglos often have different perceptions of their schools than do either blacks or Mexican-Americans. Those sentiments were revealed in a recent survey conducted by a research firm working for the Network. They found 53% of the Anglos felt that the effect of desegregation on the schools had been bad (25% said it was good); while 55% of the blacks and 34% of the Mexican-Americans stated it had been good. (Mexican-American opinions in the survey tended to be roughly midway between the Anglo and black views.) Forty-two per cent of the Anglos believed the Dallas schools are now "mostly desegregated," but only 13% of the blacks and 32% of the Mexican-Americans answered in the same manner. Only 54% of the Anglos surveyed would recommend the DISD to others but 89% of the blacks and 77% of the Mexican-Americans would do so.⁹

Conclusion. The people of Dallas have chosen compromise over violence and have elected to provide both equality of educational opportunity and quality education. The tasks ahead are complex and difficult, but revolutionary changes were enacted through evolutionary means. Paul Geisel, professor of urban affairs at the University of Texas, declared: "If there's a lesson in Dallas, it's this: don't pay attention to what we did - the specifics aren't that important and probably won't last 10 years - but look at how we did it." ¹⁰

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BOSTON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Michael Eric Siegel
Washington Semester Program
School of Government and Public Administration
The American University
Washington, D. C. 20016

There are many encouraging signs regarding school desegregation in Boston. Two of the most ardent anti-busing leaders, Pixie Paladino and Louise Day Hicks, were defeated in their bids for re-election in November, 1977, Paladino to the school committee and Hicks to the city council. Also in November, 1977, Boston voters elected to the school committee its first black member in seventy-six years. Furthermore, a superintendent with a strong background in education and racial matters, a veritable "outsider" who did not come up through the normal political patronage route of the school system, has been recently appointed to head the Boston school system (Parsons, 1978).

In addition to these personnel changes, there are some positive changes in the city's educational programs. Apparently, the magnet schools set up by Judge Garrity's orders are attracting large numbers of both black and white students, and in relatively equal proportions (Dentler, 1977). Some of the universities are taking seriously their role in helping secondary and elementary schools with which they are paired through Phase II of Garrity's order (Orfield, 1978: 46; Case, 1977). The school committee has released money for the development of curricular offerings in race relations and related fields (Lanhston and Nevins, 1977). Black and white students seem to be getting along (Mac Neil/Lehrer Report, 1978). And South Boston High, the most turbulent spot for racial confrontations during 1974-1975, has been removed from its federal receivership status and restored to the jurisdiction of the school committee (Overbea, 1978).

To be sure, problems remain. Many white middle-class families continue to leave the city. Enrollment in Greater Boston's parochial schools continues to rise, and now equals Boston's public school enrollment, despite a strong position on the part of the Archdiocese against allowing their schools to become escape hatches for anti-busing families. Finally, no demonstration of improved educational achievement can be proffered at the present time.

On balance, however, the verdict must be on the positive side, especially when we cast our evaluation in the context of the school system's past: deliberately segregated, stubbornly old-fashioned schools, rife with political patronage and blatant racism. In many

respects, Boston is in the ironic position of representing a relatively successful school desegregation effort.

As we all know, progress has not been painless. Since 1965 and the state legislature's passage of the Racial Imbalance Law, the Boston School Committee acted in almost total disregard of any mandate to implement desegregation. Its ploys to perpetuate segregated schools included school construction policies, student transfer policies, feeder patterns from junior to senior high schools, and teacher assignment programs (Abrams, 1975). Indeed, between 1965 and 1971 the number of racially imbalanced schools had increased by more than a third and the number of all white schools had also grown (Orfield, 1978: 45).

It was the intervention of the federal district court, egged on by the local NAACP activists, which declared such policies against the law and which ordered a comprehensive desegregation plan in June, 1974 (Adkins, McHugh, and Seay, 1975). According to this plan, approximately 20,000 students would be bused, but busing would be limited to areas of the city contiguous to one another. Only forty percent of Boston's schools were to be affected by the plan; however, among these were the high schools in almost all black Roxbury and almost all white South Boston.

Reactions to Garrity's order were immediate and dramatic. Grass-roots opposition groups coalesced under the ROAR umbrella and decided to reject the Judge's order by appealing to the federal government and boycotting the schools (Beck, Linden and Siegel, 1977; Siegel, 1978). The mayor was forced into the rather awkward position of trying to placate both groups, helping find money to finance the appeal of Garrity's decision to the Supreme Court on one hand, and simultaneously preparing bus schedules and allaying the worst fears of white and black parents through face-to-face meetings over coffee. Business leaders did little to aid the desegregation process, unlike their counterparts in Dallas who helped write the plan and sponsored a media campaign to prepare for the plan's implementation (Beck, Linden, and Siegel, 1977; McDonnell and Zellman, 1978).

Half way through the 1974-1975 school year, the absence of political leadership in support of busing coupled with some operational deficiencies in the Phase I order, compelled Judge Garrity to solicit advice from experts. The court appointed four eminently qualified masters to design an educationally sound approach to desegregation which would better suit local conditions. After holding hearings on eighteen different plans, the masters came up with a carefully designed city-wide desegregation plan which actually would reduce the number of bused students and attempted to maximize educational innovations, such as involving area universities in educational programs, setting up magnet schools, and creating smaller community school districts.

Garrity finally mandated the implementation of a good part of the masters' plan. As already indicated, the result has been generally positive.

Basic problems remain in Boston as they do in many other cities attempting to integrate the public schools. Despite the new trend of young, professionals returning to the inner-cities (Black, 1978), white and black middle-class families with School age children continue to leave the cities in large numbers. Consequently, attempts to integrate public schools within the city limits might become futile. Consider, for example, the dilemma of trying to integrate the Baltimore public schools where enrollment is currently 70 percent black (Orfield, 1978: 147). Finally, the real issue must be quality education, and we have not yet focused enough attention on the design of an innovative educational curriculum which can foster not only better race relations but which can help all students learn.

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CINCINNATI SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Helen C. Howe
Cincinnati Public Schools
Cincinnati, Ohio 45223

Cincinnati, once proudly referred to as the "Queen City of the West" is wearing a tarnished crown because of the deterioration of its once superb school system. Located on the Ohio River directly across from the northernmost part of Kentucky, the city of 420,000 has long been a major destination for southern migrants from Appalachia who now make up 20% of the city's population. About 30% of Cincinnati's elementary school children are Appalachian, 20% of the secondary pupils are so designated. Michael Maloney, Director of the Urban Appalachian Council, writes: "The Appalachian students drop out at alarming rates, they don't attend school regularly. They are suspended and expelled far out of proportion to their numbers." At one Appalachian predominated inner city school, the drop out rate is 46%, the absence rate is twice that of the entire system, and only 1% scores above the district's median on the 1976 reading achievement test.

Middle class flight has been draining Cincinnati of residents since 1950. The city has lost 100,000 residents while the population of Hamilton and adjacent counties has steadily increased. During the same time the percentage of black residents within the city has almost doubled from 15% to more than 27%. Today more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of the system's 73 elementary schools are racially isolated, 22 are 90% or more black and 18 are 90% or more white. Only 13 elementaries are within 20 points above or below the district's overall average of 54% black. The 20 points is the criterion for racial balance established by the U.S. Office for Civil Rights.

Cincinnati is surrounded by predominantly white incorporated areas and expansion of the city is politically impossible. Two incorporated places lie within the corporate boundaries of the city. These cities, St. Bernard and Norwood, are almost 100% white and have large industrial complexes, including Proctor and Gamble in St. Bernard and General Motors in Norwood. Just to the north of the city there is a large industrial area with the Ford Motor Company and General Electric. Because of their more advantageous tax base, these suburban areas can afford to provide better school facilities than can the inner city.

Covert housing discrimination and lower than average income have to some degree restricted black flow to the suburbs. As a result the Cincinnati School System has lost 25% of its enrollment in the past decade while the percentage of black students has jumped from 45% to 54%.

The history of public education in Cincinnati provides some basis for understanding the dilemma which the Board of Education presently faces. In 1851, a census of black children between the ages of 5 and 21 was taken. At that time city and state funds were set aside on a pro rata basis for the support of separate schools which were to be administered by a board of trustees elected by the black citizens.

The year 1889 brought change to the "colored" schools and to the Cincinnati system as well for the law establishing separate schools for negroes was repealed. The superintendent of the city's schools reported that "colored parents might prefer to send their children to schools taught by colored teachers".¹

¹ History of Negro Education in Cincinnati Public Schools, 1964, p.8

In succeeding years, the racial patterns of the schools reflected the population composition of the various districts. During the last half of the 1950's the community of Evanston changed from almost 100% white to 100% black and the school became overcrowded. The decision was made to transport 4 classes from Evanston School to the nearly all-white Oakley School and to keep the Evanston students as units at Oakley. This plan gained considerable publicity and in August, 1963, the Board of Education offices were picketed by black groups protesting the decision not to integrate and by a white group resisting integration.

On September 23, 1963, the Board accepted the superintendent's report that the original plan be followed - that Evanston pupils would not be integrated but remain in intact groups at Oakley. If, however, the Evanston pupils were to remain at Oakley for more than one year, the children would be programmed without regard to their area of residence beginning with the 1964-1965 school year.

On November 6, 1963, a suit was filed in the U.S. District Court against the Board alleging: that schools were being operated on a racially segregated basis; that negro teachers were being assigned to predominantly negro schools; that arbitrary attendance districts were established to perpetuate a racially segregated system; and that the site selection for new schools further extended the existing patterns of racial imbalance. This suit was filed on behalf of Tina Deal, a minor, by her mother and father as plaintiffs with lawyers associated with the NAACP serving as their attorneys. After lengthy litigation, the School Board was declared innocent of intentional segregation policies.

After the tumultuous period of the late 1960's and early 1970's, a 40-member citizen committee was formed to study the problems of racial segregation in the Cincinnati schools. This committee recommended that steps be taken to achieve racial balance and on December 12, 1973, a "lame duck" liberal majority on the Board of Education voted for a drastic desegregation plan shortly before leaving office. The newly elected conservative majority ignored the liberals' plan, favoring a plan of voluntary student transfers. In 1974, the NAACP brought suit against the Board on behalf of a black student, Mona Bronson, charging that the Board had consistently refused to make changes in school attendance zones and had, in fact, bought 182 temporary classrooms at the cost of \$5.5 million dollars to relieve over-crowding rather than transfer students from overcrowded white schools to black schools with low enrollments. Later the suit named 19 suburban districts whose boundaries are contiguous with Cincinnati as part of the suit. The case was to have begun November 13, 1978, but in early October, the judge postponed it until August, 1979, in response to the requests of lawyers of both sides.

In 1974 the new conservative majority on the Board adopted an open enrollment plan and an alternative school program as two cornerstones in its attempt to forestall forced busing for racial balance. The Board argues that the cost of voluntary desegregation will ultimately be less than the financial and social costs of a mandatory plan.

About 9000 or 1/7 of the system's 56,000 students are enrolled in one or the other of these two programs. Under the open enrollment plan, students may transfer to any school in the system provided that the transfer will improve racial balance. Many informed citizens view this program as a one way street because several predominantly white schools have gained substantial black enrollments, but very few black schools have succeeded in attracting white students. Of 1040 students attending another school under the open enrollment plan, 1034 were black students going to white schools, six were white youngsters making the trip the other way.

Alternative schools officially began in Cincinnati in 1973. The Cincinnati School Foundation, an independent research group, in its study found a great degree of ambiguity in the term "alternative". This optional educational program in reality includes three different programs: alternative programs which function within a neighborhood school as a full day optional curriculum; alternative schools which are devoted entirely to alternative offerings and serve no specific neighborhood; and magnet schools which serve as neighborhood schools but house no program other than the alternative. In 1978-79 there are 14 different alternative programs at 42 school sites. These programs must maintain a 70%-30% racial balance, but black students predominate, making up 60% of the students enrolled in alternative offerings.

There is great diversity of opinion within the city about the merits of the Board's open enrollment and alternative programs. Many fear that the programs drain both students and resources from the neighborhood schools. This is particularly true in the inner city West End which has lost 3/4 of its population since 1960 because of urban renewal and 14 of the schools in this area have been closed or turned over to alternative programs. Here the naturally declining enrollments are being worsened by the outflow of students going to a suburban white high school under the open enrollment plan. Taft, the black high school, lost 163 of its 900 students, about 15%, while only one white student opted to transfer to Taft. Because of the low enrollment, fewer options in courses are available. Those who choose to leave are usually the students who are more capable and more highly motivated.

One of the major concerns of the Cincinnati Foundation study of alternative education was its inability to measure the costs of the various alternative programs in relation to the cost of traditional school offerings. Bus transportation is just one of the costly factors involved. Of the total annual budget of \$1 million for yellow bus transportation, transportation for elementary school children costs \$600,000. About \$300 per pupil is spent on alternative school transportation while the statewide average for transportation is \$75 per child. Half of the 109 bus routes have fewer than 20 students. Jerome Couzins, Director of Transportation for the Cincinnati Schools, says, "It's extremely inefficient and uneconomical form of transportation from a cost per pupil viewpoint." More than 100 alternative students are transported by vans or taxis at an additional cost of \$70,000 a year because bus service is impractical.

In addition, about \$170,000 was budgeted for extra personnel and supplies for the alternative programs - over and above that which would have been budgeted for regular schools. An administrative study for the year 1975-1976 stated that the additional cost of alternative programs for that year including transportation was \$1 1/4 million above that which would have been spent if students had attended their traditional neighborhood schools. Another statistic shows that the additional cost per pupil for alternative schools is \$19, but for the Academy of Math and Science, the cost is \$400 per pupil.

Social problems have presented serious difficulties for some transfer students. Many forego after school activities rather than take a late bus home. For some the educational gap is a difficult one to bridge, because they need remedial help and a boost in "learning-spirit" as one veteran teacher observed. Many whites look down upon a diploma from a white high school. Few signed up for the career oriented new Queen City Vocational School in the inner city until the Board dropped the requirement that they take their academic classes at nearby Taft High School and receive a Taft diploma.

Instead of an integrative effect, these programs have often led to divisions among students. Black and white students in a Montessori program work together without racial tension, but they are confined to the top floor of a building and have almost no contact with regular students downstairs. The Montessori students arrive and depart at different times, eat lunch, and play after the neighborhood students have done so in an effort to protect the 81 black students from the taunts, obscenities, and fists of the older, almost all-white student body. Students of the Academy of Math and Science, housed in a first floor wing of Woodward High School, view the older students in the regular programs with disdain.

The alternative programs have proved to be a way for the Board to maintain the staunch neighborhood school orientation which prevails in Cincinnati; however, many believe that while these programs were designed to provide a voluntary program to achieve racial integration, the educational justification for them is still to come. The question of whether the alternative concept is in general meeting the needs for which it was designed is really a two-part question - one part involves the extent to which it is doing so and the other involves the cost of doing so. Current accounting procedures make the second part of this question virtually unanswerable.

When the suit comes to trial, much court time will probably be spent in arguing about the relationship between racial isolation in the schools and the intense racial segregation in the housing market. In 1972, 1/3 of the black residents in Cincinnati lived in census tracts which were 90% or more black. HOME (Housing Opportunities Made Equal) which is designed to prevent discrimination in housing, found that the practice of steering blacks to certain neighborhoods was widespread. The study showed that blacks had a 40% chance of encountering discrimination in searching for an apartment and 60% in purchasing a home. The School Board maintains that racial isolation in schools reflects the social and economic factors in the housing market. The NAACP argues that the Board has taken advantage of segregated housing in the construction of new schools and the gerrymandering of school boundaries.

Many concerned citizens feel that it is mere common sense to plan for metropolitan desegregation in advance of a court order. Court ordered busing for Cincinnati alone would accelerate the deterioration of the city's core area, would encourage an exodus of employees, would discourage new industries from locating within the city, and would further erode the tax base.

The metropolitan approach would have problems too. The county's 150,000 school children are divided among 22 separate districts, each with its own operating tax rate, bond debt, salary schedule, policies, and administrative staff. Merging these districts is a mind boggling prospect.

Several proposals for a county-wide system of desegregation have been proposed. One would provide for a federation of school boards to handle larger issues such as tax levies, keeping the present structure of separate boards to handle the day-by-day problems. Another plan calls for the establishment of 4 quadrants with identical sets of alternative schools. Parents would draw up a list of 5 preferences among the alternatives. Their children would be assigned to one of their choices within the quadrant to limit the amount of busing necessary to achieve racial balance.

Unfortunately Cincinnatians seem to be endowed with a feeling of superiority about their city. Although the courts have ordered some form of school desegregation in almost every system close to Cincinnati,

many believe that it cannot happen here. Some believe that the courts have grown more conservative in recent years; others believe that the Cincinnati Board was found innocent in the 1960's in similar charges in the NAACP's first suit, Tina Deal vs. the Cincinnati Board of Education. Local NAACP officials say that their first case was bungled in the courts and they will not make the same mistakes again. This time they have brought Louis Lucas, experienced desegregation attorney from Memphis, to represent them. The final verdict will hinge on whether the racial imbalances arose as a natural and foreseeable result of the Board's actions or by accident. Predictions vary on the outcome.

Together black and Appalachian students make up 75% of the district's enrollment. Because neighborhood schools are even more segregated economically than they are racially, blacks and Appalachians see a lot of each other as they are pitted against each other for jobs, housing, meager social services. Any desegregation plan that does not take economic desegregation into effect will not be effective at all.

INDIANAPOLIS SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Ralph K. Bedwell
Broad Ripple High School
Indianapolis Public School
Indianapolis, Indiana 46220

History

The Indianapolis desegregation case has been in the Federal Courts since 1968. The origins of the case date back to the Indiana law passed in 1869 creating separate schools for blacks and whites. The law was enforced from 1869 until 1946, creating a dual school which were often not located in the area where students lived and the school system would not provide transportation nor pay for transportation to the schools. By the 1920's, as a result of the locations of schools, the restrictive housing ordinances, and general racial discrimination, many blacks had moved into the areas where their children were attending school. In 1927 the school board built Crispus Attucks High School specifically for black students.

Beginning in the late 1920's and continuing through 1974 the Indianapolis Board of School Commissioners was dominated by a citizens group composed mainly of white middle and upper middle class businessmen and women whose policies reflected their own personal value system.

In 1947 the state of Indiana repealed the 1869 segregation law. All schools were to discontinue the policies of segregated schools. In 1953 the Board of School Commissioners established the neighborhood schools concept. Thus, a child would attend the elementary and high school closest to his home. As a result the school system had two predominately black high schools - Shortridge and Crispus Attucks and the remaining high schools were from 3% to about 30% black. This worked in fact, if not in intent, to reaffirm separate schools for blacks and whites due to the housing patterns which had by 1953 been firmly established.

IPS experienced a large population growth between 1953 and 1968 due in part to the annexation of adjoining newly populated areas into the old city. In accordance with the neighborhood school concept new schools were built in areas either with real or projected student growth.

In 1968 the NAACP requested the Justice Department investigate discrimination in IPS. At the time the city school system still maintained de jure elementary schools dating from the old 1869 state law. The Justice Department brought legal action against IPS for racial discrimination on May 31, 1968. A plan for using voluntary and involuntary transfers of faculty to integrate all staffs was approved by the School Board on July 3, 1968.

The Governor of the State signed a law on March 13, 1969, which ultimately had a great impact on the school system and the ensuing desegregation case. This law created a unified city-county government. The exceptions were fire and police protection and the school systems and the towns of Lawrence, Speedway and Beech Grove.

On July 1, 1969, the 31-member citizens advisory committee was established to draw up a desegregation plan for the city system. Federal District Court Judge S. Hugh Dillin rendered his decision on August 18, 1971, in the IPS case. He found the system guilty of de jure segregation of the schools. Provisions included in the decision were: (a) defendants were enjoined from racial discrimination in any school action; (b) assign faculty and staff so that no racial school is racially identifiable; (c) continue plans to desegregate Crispus Attucks High School and seek a relocation site; (d) revise the majority to minority transfer policy; (e) attempt to negotiate with outside school corporations to effect transfers of minority students to such school corporations and (f) take action to prevent schools, not already there, from reaching the "tipping point". Dillin also ordered the Justice Department to name the State of Indiana and school corporations surrounding IPS as defendants to see if there would be a legal basis for a metropolitan school system. The last item specially addresses the issue of UNIGOV and the omission of schools from the law.

During the next eighteen months a variety of motions and counter motions were filed with the District Court, Appellate Court and the Supreme Court in regard to Judge Dillin's decision. The school system made some progress in implementing parts a, b, d, and f during the appeals process. Dillin on June 26, 1973 stated, "The question before this trial is whether or not it's practical, feasible and workable to desegregate Indianapolis Public Schools within its (the schools systems) own boundaries." The District Court also ruled that sociological and psychological data could not be brought into consideration of the case.

On July 20, 1973, the District Court ordered a one-way busing of Negro pupils to suburban school systems and a percentage balance of IPS schools among interim criteria for development of a comprehensive desegregation plan, to be in effect the following September. On August 20, 1973, Dr. Glatt and Dr. Taylor were appointed as court commissioners to develop an interim plan for the following year. Judge Dillin ordered IPS to apply for Federal desegregation monies available under the Civil Rights Act. In December, 1973, the District Court charged the state Legislature with the task of developing a desegregation plan for central Indiana. On August 22, 1974, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed thirteen of twenty-four central Indiana defendants from the desegregation case. The thirteen defendants dismissed were outside the Marion County area.

The Justice Department on March 3, 1975, filed a position paper with the court stating that: (1) total consolidation with neither necessary nor appropriate under terms of the Supreme Court's Detroit decision; (2) urged Judge Dillin to restore IPS power to annex territories and power to cause transfer between districts; and (3) limited inter-districts plan should be based on desegregation, health, safety, welfare, time and distance of busing, adequate facilities and financial burden. Between 1975 and January 1977 a variety of appeals and other legal actions were filed by a variety of defendants in the case.

On January 25, 1977, a summary order by the U. S. Supreme Court remanded the appealed IPS desegregation case back to the 7th Court of Appeals to reconsider its ruling in light of two recent previous cases and decisions by the Supreme Court, Village of Arlington Heights vs. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation and Washington vs. Davis. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the District Court for further consideration to determine if the evidence warranted inclusion of eight township schools in a plan involving IPS on February 14, 1978. The District Court stated on April 7, 1978, that the intradistrict plan would be counter-productive. The Court ruled that options,

lotteries, and magnet programs were permissible only as means of improving the educational programs, not as a means of desegregation. The court ruled that the lottery program for incoming ninth grade students was not to be used. On July 2, 1978, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court of Appeals; reversed the District Court's order insofar as it denied the IPS permission to implement Phase I of Desegregation Design - 1979, remanding to the District Court direction to enter an order permitting implementation.

Since the July ruling by the Appeals Court the IPS board has attempted to have the District Court reopen hearings on the possibility of two-way busing. At the present time the case is waiting for the appeal process to continue. The District Court Judge granted a stay on the busing of over 6,000 black students to the eight identified county schools until the beginning of the second semester.

Instructional Innovations Related to Desegregation, 1968-1978

According to Assistant to the Superintendent for Planning, Joe Payne, the Board of School Commissioners and the central office staff were very surprised that the system was thought to be in violation of the law. The use of neighborhood schools concept was to allow students to attend the school nearest to their homes. The fact that the neighborhood schools created all black and all white schools was not thought to be in violation of the law.

From the time of the initial actions by the Justice Department until the election of the present board in 1974 the use of instructional innovative techniques to assist in desegregation were minimal.

According to Payne the board policy was to abide by and not to violate the law but not to take any action on their own to implement desegregation plans. Payne stated the primary objective of the board during the early seventies was to improve education not to desegregate. The only changes in educational philosophy or direction were: (1) granting a general diploma to all graduates rather than an academic, a fine arts or a general diploma; (2) an attempt to create an academic high school. The selection of Shortridge High School for this academic school was based on three significant factors; (a) the school's history as an academic school; (b) the school was fast becoming an all black school; and (c) a large and powerful interest group within the community was interested in "saving Shortridge". This program failed after two years. In 1971 Shortridge was again the pilot for an innovative school within a school program. This particular program encountered a variety of problems from lack of good organization to lack of students and was closed after one year.

In 1974 a new school board was elected which had as their primary objective the desegregation of the school system. A second objective was to improve instruction in the classrooms. These two objectives were intricately tied together. The board decided on three different approaches to improving instruction in the classroom. The first was an options program for grades 1-6, the second part of the overall program was the establishment of separate junior high schools, the third part was the desegregation program based on the previously established ratio for all schools of no more than 60% of any one race in any school.

The board established a committee to identify needs, desires and possible programs for students grades 1-6. This program involved a great deal of time and effort on the part of the central office as well as parents. Throughout the school year meetings were held in all areas of the city for the purpose of informing parents of the different options for the elementary schools in order that the parents could make intelligent decisions. Following the administering

of questionnaires to parents concerning which options they felt the school system should offer, the board approved six optional elementary programs ranging from back to basics to experimental. All parents were provided ballots and information on each of the options. If parents failed to respond the central office would select a school for their child. The restrictions on options were that parents select programs not buildings, that each school would meet the 60-40 quota, and that a certain number must sign up for a program in order that the program begin.

The establishment of a junior high school program was not tied directly to the options program but was a part of an attempt to provide better learning situations for junior high students and to assist eleven junior high schools. With the exception of two middle schools, the IPS structure has been Kindergarten through eight.

The high school program had two parts. The first was the magnet school concept. The old districts based on neighborhood concept were to be totally changed. Under this program three magnet schools were to be established. One, (Crispus Attucks) was to be the Health Related school because of its close proximity to the I. U. Medical Center. The School for the Performing Arts was to be Shortridge. The third magnet school was to be Arsenal Technical High School for vocational related training. Any student could select one of the three magnet schools to attend and the system would provide transportation to and from the home school to the magnet school. Under this system the feeder school structure was to be changed to include groupings of high schools for students to select from for high school attendance. Each incoming freshman could select his first, second and third choice for high school. There was to then be a lottery and students would receive their first choice as long as the freshman class at that school stayed within the 60-40 ratio.

All three of these programs were to start in the fall of 1978. After a great deal of discussion and reactions both from the court and parent groups, the options program was altered to a pilot program limited to a few schools in the system for one year. The junior high program was stayed pending the final disposition of the desegregation case. The lottery system was used to determine where each incoming freshman would attend and the three magnet schools opened the fall of 1978.

The last ten years has been an enormously difficult time for the school system. The number of students enrolled has dropped from a 1968 figure of 108,000 to the 1978 figure of 73,000. The percentage of black students has risen from 30% in 1968 to 47.5% in 1978. The decreasing enrollments of students and the increasing black enrollment is due in part to the legal case. However, other factors involved include birth rates, white-flight, and growth of private schools. The present status of the case does not add any stability to the educational atmosphere. The initiation of possible programs that are then delayed or stopped because of the case, the constant in-fighting within the system and between old and new school board members all lends an atmosphere of uncertainty about the school system. The basic issues left unsettled in the case are one or two-way busing, the relationship of UNIGOV to the desegregation case, and the role of the state of Indiana in the case. Many participants in the case feel that a final settlement may not come for another two to five years.

DETROIT SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Mary L. Gendernalik
Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan 48202

In most instances of court ordered school desegregation strong emphasis, of the plans implemented to achieve desegregation, is placed on manipulation of student school assignment to achieve fairly consistent racial mix ratios. Such plans delineate the means by which school attendance boundaries, middle and secondary school feeder patterns can be adjusted to produce student populations which reflect the desired ratios. Additional efforts to insure desegregation have included the creation of magnet schools, cluster schools, satellite zoning, and alternative programs - all of which deal with the manipulation of student populations. For the most part, more recent court cases have also required that the desegregation plans demonstrate an equitable distribution of the burden of desegregating; that is, if the plan calls for students to be assigned to non-neighborhood schools (which the above mentioned manipulations frequently require) then appropriate proportions of all racial groups residing in the district must be subjected to the adjusted assignment plan. Furthermore, special programs or alternatives stipulated in the desegregation plan must accommodate (even if thru quotas) students from all racial groups in the district.

Pupil assignment issues have dominated the short but volatile history of desegregation. The emphasis on pupil assignments patterns deals with the most obvious yet superficial symptom of segregation - the overt isolation of members of different racial groups. The hope of such plans, has nonetheless been that mutual benefit both in terms of educational opportunity and social integration would result.

The problems inherent in that approach become readily evident upon examination of the Detroit desegregation effort. Initial actions to desegregate Detroit schools were taken by the Detroit school board in April, 1970. At that time the plan involved the alteration of the attendance boundaries of 12 Detroit High Schools. In July, 1970 Governor Milliken signed into law a bill overturning the Detroit desegregation plan. In August, 1970 the NAACP filed suit in federal district court asking that the Detroit plan be restored. Thus began the series of episodes which sought to desegregate Detroit schools. Two major problems emerged in the Detroit case which have not yet been adequately resolved, both of which are central to a pupil-reassignment oriented plan. First of all, the student population of the Detroit public schools was rapidly shifting to a majority black (i.e. majority-minority) makeup. Population studies and demographic predictions all indicated that the population of the city and more specifically the city's public schools was moving and would continue to move toward a predominantly black population. These demographic relations prove problematic to a desegregation plan which focuses on a racial mix solution. Federal district Judge Stephen Roth ordered a cross-district bussing plan involving Detroit and 452 suburban school districts. The judge's order if implemented would have involved the bussing of 350,000 school children and would have involved sufficient numbers of black and white children to accomplish desegregation at a level significantly greater than any intra-district plan could provide.

Numerous defendant appeals impeded the implementation of Judge Roth's order. In July, 1974 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the cross-district plan, but upheld the finding of de-jure segregation in Detroit.

Shortly after the supreme court decision Judge DeMascio replaced Judge Roth on the Detroit Desegregation Case. Judge DeMascio ordered a panel to formulate

a Detroit only desegregation plan. The three and 1/2 intervening years since the start of litigation was a period of further erosion of the white student population. Concomitantly certain neighborhoods and their schools had been integrated by virtue of shifts in population relocation. The focus of the DeMascio desegregation plan which was ordered in August, 1975 and initially implemented in January, 1976 was broadened significantly to include consideration of issues of impact of prior segregation on students and racially motivated prejudicial practices.

The shift in focus takes up the more recently recognized and far more complex problems of educational excellence. These were somewhat simplistically, assumed by early desegregation plans to be neutralized if not solved by enforcing a racial mix formula. The DeMascio plan included ten components - of which pupil reassignment was only one. The others include 1) student code of conduct, 2) bilingual, bicultural and multi-ethnic studies, 3) vocational education, 4) reading and communications skills, 5) testing, 6) counseling and career guidance, 7) inservice training, 8) school community relations, 9) Co-curricular. The rationale for the plan acknowledged the futility of a singularly focused effort - pupil reassignment - and focused instead on areas that were more specifically educational and more subtly implicated in eliminating segregatory effect. The Detroit plan was to be implemented by the Detroit Public Schools with the costs of implementation being equally divided between the school district and the State of Michigan (which were co-defendants in the court case). Implementation was to be monitored and reviewed by a court appointed Monitoring Commission made up of prominent and interested community representatives. A monitoring commission staff was also created, funded by the state and charged with training the in-school volunteer monitors, developing feedback and evaluation instruments, and carrying out monitoring commission business. A detailed description of the monitoring system exceeds the limits of this paper. Its elaborate network of sub-committees (each concerned with one of the plan's components), data gathering strategies, liaisons with public school officials as well as plaintiffs and the court are each discussion topics in their own right.

Much of what the monitoring commission and staff have been involved in since January, 1976 has been defining in operational terms, the goals of desegregation and the actions ordered by the court; the collection and analysis of data relevant to those goals; recommendations to the court regarding effectiveness and compliance.

Evaluating compliance in a multifocused desegregation plan like Detroit's is somewhat easier than evaluating its effectiveness. It is nonetheless far more difficult than evaluating compliance with a more narrowly focused pupil-reassignment plan. In Detroit the problems of defining compliance in anything more than superficial numerical terms (e.g. number of students per counselor, number of counselors per building, number of inservice sessions held, etc.) persist. Problems of defining effectiveness of overcoming segregation effects in a manner that facilitates accurate, valid and reliable evaluation nag at not only the monitoring commission and staff but at school and state officials as well. These problems, I suspect, are no less real in other communities, but they predominate in Detroit by virtue of the nature of its desegregation plan.

Nothing that has been summarized in this paper should be interpreted to mean that implementation of Detroit's desegregation plan as been or is tranquil and anxiety free. The relative calm that prevailed even during the initial pupil reassignment stage can in part be attributed to the fact that the numbers of pupils bussed were relatively small, the distances relatively short, and the

weather absolutely freezing. It should also be noted that three of the school district's eight regions were not included in the pupil-reassignment portion of the plan. These three regions enroll almost 100% black student populations. Other problems that plague desegregation efforts are the tensions which exist between the monitoring commission and district officials. The fact that the former is engaged in evaluating the latter and has ready access to the media for disseminating its reports and data has done little to produce a highly trusting, cooperative working relationship. Recent court reconsiderations which seek to extend the pupil-reassignment plan into the above mentioned three regions by identifying spanish-surname children as white and ording them reassigned has produced considerable furror among the Latino community. Questions concerning whether the makeup of the monitoring commission is representative of the community and indeed whether it should be disbanded have also arisen and will only be resolved after extensive legal and political energies are expended. The specter of further court action also lurks in the wings as the desegregation plan does not, in its present form, satisfy the plaintiff - NAACP, which still seeks a cross-district or inter-district plan.

All of these contingencies plus consideration of the fact that much Federal money (the ESAA, and ESEA titles) has been used to fund implementation of components, make examination and understanding of desegregation in Detroit a complex and fascinating study in legal, political and educational policy. Detroit's experience lends credence to the suspicion that legalistic efforts to solve social and cultural maladies often do no more than to reveal the depth, pervasiveness and complexity of the problem. Such revelations are nonetheless essential to ultimate resolutions.

This brief summary is insufficient without acknowledgement of the efforts made to prevent violence and extremes of divisiveness from marring the implementation of the Detroit desegregation plan. Those efforts came not only from school personnel but from the community as well. Some examples will serve to illustrate the point. During the mid to late sixties when total school populations were increasing, concerted efforts were made by school district officials to hire minority teachers and to adjust proportions of white and black faculty in individual schools to effect integrated staffing. Such efforts could not have been peaceably realized without the endorsement and support of the Detroit Federation of Teachers. All subsequent efforts at preparing the instructional staff for desegregation have been jointly undertaken by administrative and federation officials. A concerted effort on the part of the school officials was made to prepare neighborhood and community people for the implementation of the plan. Parents of students who would be bussed, were encouraged to visit their new schools and to ride the bus routes. Meetings were held throughout the city to allow community members to voice their concerns and to get responses and reassurance. from both school and community leaders. In addition to school personnel, civic leaders and prominent persons from the black and white communities joined forces to promote a smooth transition period. The importance of community involvement in such endeavors is further evidenced by the nature and make-up of the Monitoring Commission and the inclusion in the plan of a community relations component.

The current efforts to provide a desegregated education to Detroit schools would not be as far along as they are if these vital elements of cooperation had not been fostered. Detroit can take considerable pride in its strivings to deal rationally and compassionately in its endeavors to desegregate its schools.

LOS ANGELES DESEGREGATION

Muriel Paskin Carrison
Professor of Education
California State University Dominguez Hills
Carson, California 90747

One of the most current areas of desegregation involved in the news today is that of Los Angeles. This paper will present 1) the unique geographical patterns of the Los Angeles Unified School District, 2) the ethnic/racial composition of the district, 3) the chronology of court litigations including school district plans and public protests, and 4) current and future problems.

Geographical Patterns. The Los Angeles Unified School District comprises the nation's largest land area with over 700 square miles and the nation's second largest enrollment of almost 600,000 students. The geographic pattern is quite unique in that from its north to south borders it is over fifty miles. From its east to west borders it ranges from over thirty miles to under two miles. Furthermore, there are more than half a dozen separate school district pockets within this area such as the Beverly Hills, Santa Monica and Culver City School Districts. The unique geographical patterns are further compounded by the fact that almost two dozen smaller districts such as Burbank, Pasadena, Lynwood, Wiseburn, Inglewood, Manhattan Beach, Compton and Palos Verdes surround and invade the Los Angeles school district borders. For the most part, these districts are economically and/or ethnically segregated.

Ethnic/Racial Composition of the Los Angeles Unified School District. When Horace Greeley said, "Go west, young man," he must have been indicating that the young man in question should move to southern California. And, more specifically, to the Los Angeles basin. Perhaps the Los Angeles basin contains the most heterogenous populations in America. This comprises all the socio-economic classes from the "upper-upper" to the "lower-lower" in almost two hundred different nationality, ethnic and racial groups. Some of these groups in the Los Angeles area are the following:

1. Anglo (includes west, east and south Europeans).
2. Asian/Pacific Island (includes Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Korean, Laotian, Cambodian, Indians, Fillipinos, Samoans).
3. Blacks (includes Afro-Americans, Carribean and South and Central Americans).
4. Hispanic (includes Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Central and South Americans).
5. Native Americans (American Indians of all the original North American nations).

There are some estimates that there are more Native Americans in Los Angeles than are living on the government reservations (97,000). The Los Angeles Fillipino population exceeds that of Manila (75,000). Again, there are estimates that the Samoan population exceeds that of American Samoa.

The San Pedro area contains more than thirty different pockets of east and southern Europeans who are very proud of their ethnic heritage. The

Windsor Hills area has consistently scored among the nation's highest one per cent in standard test scores. The Windsor Hills population is almost 100% black professional upper and middle class. Each area in the district is in essence an economic, racial or ethnic enclave. There is no pride in being a "Los Angelean" as such Pride is based rather on neighborhood residence.

According to the Los Angeles school district's latest ethnic census, the enrollment is about 5% Asian American, 25% black, 30% Mexican American, 35% Anglo and 5% American Indian and "others." If all schools would be evenly balanced, "Anglos" would be in the minority. The United States Supreme Court has said that the use of percentage formulas is proper although deviation may be justified when adherence in every case is not feasible. Perhaps, in Los Angeles, adherence is not feasible.

The most recent figures show that there are about 300 (out of a total of 564 elementary, junior and senior high schools) that are 50% or more minority enrollment. (This does not take into account economic status). Two hundred schools have 75% or more minority enrollment and 180 schools have 75% or more Anglo enrollment. Over 150 schools have 97% minority enrollment.

Chronology of Court Litigations, School District and Public Actions. For over fifteen years there has been a multitude of court litigations, district plans and public protests. The highlights of these are the following:

August, 1963. The American Civil Liberties Union filed suit against the Los Angeles School Board, naming two racially imbalanced schools. The schools that the ACLU singled out were Jordan High School which was almost 100% black and South Gate High School which was almost 100% white. These two high schools were only 1.5 miles apart. This action also included other factual information which proved that for decades, the Los Angeles School District had planned and built schools deliberately for the purposes of segregating racial, ethnic and economic populations.

September, 1963. Judge Alfred Gitelson issued show-case order to correct these imbalances. The school board committee filed a report denying gerrymandering.

December, 1963. The school board adapted a statement on "equal educational opportunity." This, in essence, was a list of compensatory educational programs in segregated schools. These programs were mainly supported by federal and state funds and legislative acts.

February, 1964. The school board adopted a plan to transport students from two crowded schools in South Central Los Angeles to Westchester. This plan slightly ameliorated racial/economic imbalance in these two schools.

July, 1966. The ACLU acted on behalf of 13 black and 5 Mexican American students and amended its 1963 suit to include the entire Los Angeles Unified School District.

September, 1968. Small scale voluntary busing began in Los Angeles. This included very few schools. For the most part only "liberal" and the "better" educated parents involved their children in this project.

October, 1968. The ACLU initiated trial began of expanding the desegregation case.

November, 1968. About 220 more students were added to the voluntary busing program.

April, 1969. The Los Angeles Unified School Board ended the open enrollment policy. The school Board agreed to give priority to transfer requests that would improve racial balance.

May, 1969. The desegregation trial ended. The court opinion was awaited.

February, 1970. Judge Gitelson ruled against the Los Angeles School Board. He directed the board to have an integration plan in operation by September 1, 1970. The board said that it would appeal the decision. During this trial, the school board estimated that total desegregation of the school district would require busing 240,000 students a day at a cost of 40 million dollars the first year and 20 million dollars a year thereafter. Judge Gitelson dismissed these estimates as inflated.

March, 1975. The State Court of Appeal reversed the Gitelson ruling saying that the school board did not intentionally discriminate against minority students.

The "Bustop" organization and other anti-busing movements became quite vocal and prominent. Bobbi Fiedler became their spokeswoman. This group originated in the Pacific Palisades area of Los Angeles -- an upper-middle class Anglo section. Bobbi Fiedler was elected to the school board during the next election year.

June, 1975. The California Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

April, 1976. Under pressure from the federal government, the Los Angeles school system began to move to desegregate teaching staffs at individual schools. An estimated 200 to 300 permanent teachers were scheduled to be transferred during the year. Another 500 teachers were scheduled for transfer in 1977. In all, about 2,000 transfers would be needed, but most would involve nonpermanent teachers. By September, 1976, no school was to have less than 10% or more than 50% minority teachers. By September, 1977, no school was to have less than 20% or more than 40% minority teachers.

June, 1976. The school board adopted a resolution saying that there would be no compulsory busing of students. And then, ten days later adopted another resolution which in effect, rescinded the antibusing stand.

White middle-class parents began to show up regularly at school board meetings to uphold the sanctity of the neighborhood school and proclaimed the physical and environmental dangers of children riding buses. Parents also complained about "wasted time" spent on buses and lost opportunities to participate in after-school activities.

Minority parents also began to attend school board meetings. They protested that busing and desegregation would provide great loss of fundings to individual Title I schools, bilingual and other compensatory education programs.

March, 1977. Judge Paul Egly presided over a hearing to determine whether the school board plan for partial desegregation met the California Supreme Court requirements that the board take "reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation." The proposed plan stressed a variety of voluntary desegregation options but also included the gradual phasing in of mandatory programs beginning in February, 1978. The plans of the school board included school pairing, magnet schools and partial-day integration.

May, 1977. Judge Egly became quite skeptical about the board's definition of "minority" and "a segregated school". He also questioned the 30-minute limit the board placed on mandatory bus rides. Proposed specialized centers, Judge Egly commented, only included students of 4th, 5th, and 6th grades for one hour a day and only emphasized the social studies and science. Why should these centers not also emphasize reading, writing and computational skills? Egly said that if he rejected the school board's plans, then he would write a new one himself.

October, 1977. The Los Angeles school board members voted 5-2 to adopt the new desegregation plan that called for the busing of about 100,000 children in grades 4 through 8. Over 200,000 children were left in over 150 racially isolated schools. These schools were mostly in the Watts (black populations) and East Los Angeles (Hispanic populations) areas. They could not be desegregated under the proposed rules because they were more than 45 minutes drive from any concentration of white students.

September, 1978. Los Angeles police readied contingencies as the busing date of September 12th approached. The school district informed principals and teachers with recommendations on how to handle broad types of crisis situations. The district also set up a program called "Community Network" to try to inform parents about the busing plans and encourage them to comply. Television stations were urged to accept school district busing commercials as a "public service"

Two weeks before the school term was to begin, "Bustop" and other anti-busing groups in a last ditch attempt continued to fight the desegregation plans. The safety of buses and students were cited by these opponents in appeals to two federal courts. On September 9th, three days before school was to begin, Supreme Court Justice William H. Rehnquist refused to halt the Los Angeles Busing.

Busing calmly began in Los Angeles although a few parents did try to stop the buses by parking their cars sideways along street and freeway bus routes.

Although the school board proclaimed desegregation and busing to be an initial success, newspapers reported that only one-third of the planned Anglos were joining in the mandatory busing. It is still too early for school officials to keep count of pupils, but many reports claim that enrollment at the Los Angeles schools are again creeping upward.

November, 1978. The State of California Board of Education and the State Attorney General are currently conducting an investigation of reported "gross discrepancies" between officially reported integrated school attendance and actual attendance to determine the magnitude of this discrepancy and to make a judgement as to whether this discrepancy is accidental or intentional.

Current and Future Problems. After 15 bitter years, less than 9% (60,000) of the current students (570,000) enrolled in the Los Angeles Unified School District are currently involved in any type of voluntary or mandatory desegregation plan. Judge Egly has appointed a commission to monitor and evaluate the success of the current plan and to assess the viability of future plans.

Over twenty university professors have been appointed to advise and monitor the Los Angeles schools on a grass-roots level throughout the school year. The school district has made valiant efforts at in-service education of teachers and administrators not only in integrated facilities, but also in racially isolated schools. Evaluation reports on achievements and attitudes will be made four times during this school year. These reports and district plans for increasing desegregation will be reviewed by Judge Egly.

However, today, the basic problems of desegregation in Los Angeles remain:

- How does one define a minority group?
- How does one define an integrated school?
- How can traditional prejudice be overcome?
- How can a geographically vast school district be effectively integrated?
- How can all children be protected from the frustration and violence evidenced by some children who come from the less fortunate economic segments of our populations?

We agree that quality education of minorities does not involve equal but separate schools. Public schools are our last hope for a multi-racial and ethnic society. And, two-way busing is our "last hope for heading off educational apartheid."

It is this writer's opinion that the Los Angeles School District can be desegregated only by including socio-economic head-counts with racial/ethnic head counts and only by forming desegregation plans with school district pockets within and without the immediate and current confines of the school district. Hopefully, this will be able to be accomplished within the next decade.

FLASH: On November 13, 1978, the Judge and commissioners called for cross-district busing. Los Angeles could set a precedent for the rest of the country.